La Paz, 04/16/26 – The imminent presentation of the draft of a new hydrocarbons law has been announced, which would replace Law 3058, approved more than 20 years ago in a political, social, and ideological context entirely different from today’s.
In 2005, Bolivia had proven and probable reserves (albeit inflated) for more than 50 years, an export contract to Brazil in full expansion, and another—still incipient—to Argentina; in short, an energy and monetary wealth that fueled hopes for a better future for the country.
According to all sector indicators, two decades of populist governments have left the country in even more disastrous and vulnerable conditions than those in which it was handed over to them.
Many analysts consider that the main obstacle to changing public policies is the Political Constitution of the State (known as CPE in Spanish), approved in 2009. A constitution is supposed to be a social contract valid for several generations, not tied to political or ideological circumstances. However, from its conception to its adoption and implementation, the new CPE has proved to be an instrument of division and a straitjacket—even for those who drafted and sponsored it.
In particular, the articles related to natural resources, hydrocarbons, and energy have aged rapidly, without the possibility of applying a proper euthanasia to them. In fact, the hydrocarbons chapter (ownership, YPFB’s monopoly over exploitation and commercialization, royalties, and taxes) is based on the assumption that Bolivia would produce these hydrocarbons ad infinitum. Reality is different: production has fallen to levels seen at the beginning of the century; reserves will last only a few more years at the current rate of exploitation; exploration—absent over the past 20 years—will take several years to bear fruit, modest in any case; industrialization has turned out to be a failure and an additional problem for the country, and YPFB, a company plagued by countless ailments, has been reduced mainly to a fuel importer.
The CPE is often presented as a “bogeyman” in the face of any change in the economic model, but paradoxically, despite its nationalist and statist bias, it implies that, in the absence of domestic production, YPFB would have no reason to maintain its monopoly. Indeed, Article 359 states that ownership of hydrocarbons produced in the country belongs to the State; however, ownership of imported fuels clearly belongs to whoever purchases them, with full rights (not as a gracious concession) to commercialize them.
This consideration underpins the liberalization of the fuel market and the resizing of YPFB into just another company within market competition—an aspect implicitly contained in the 2004 Gas Referendum, later distorted by Law 3058 and the “nationalization” decree of May 1, 2006.
All that remains is to hope that the new hydrocarbons law will draw on past experience and the leeway allowed by the CPE, without the need to amend it beforehand.
Best regards, and good health,
Francesco